BACKUP
CATALOG DELETE
VSS
REPOSITORY
DetectionBlue TeamSOCOctober 12, 2026•9 min read

Detecting Backup Deletion and Tampering Before Ransomware

Operators destroy your ability to restore before they encrypt. A deleted catalog or stopped backup service is a countdown, not a housekeeping event.

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Ransomware crews know that a clean backup ends their leverage, so they go after it first: stopping backup services, deleting catalogs and shadow copies, and reaching into backup servers for stored credentials. These actions are rare in normal operations and tightly clustered before deployment, which makes them high-value early warnings.

Signals at a Glance

SignalWhereATT&CK
wbadmin delete catalog or delete systemstatebackupSysmon 1, 4688T1490
vssadmin or wmic shadow copy deletionSysmon 1, EDRT1490
Backup agent or service stopped outside a change windowSystem 7036, EDRT1489
Non-backup process reading the backup configuration databaseEDR, SQL auditT1555
Mass deletion of backup files on a repository shareFile audit 4663T1485

Backup Destruction Commands

The built-in commands are noisy by design and almost never run by administrators at scale. Treat any occurrence outside a documented maintenance task as an alert, and raise it to critical when it follows credential access on the same host:

title: Backup Catalog or Shadow Copy Deletion
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  sel_wbadmin:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'wbadmin'
      - 'delete'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'catalog'
      - 'systemstatebackup'
      - 'backup'
  sel_vss:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'shadows'
      - 'delete'
  sel_wmic:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'shadowcopy'
      - 'delete'
  condition: 1 of sel_*
level: high
# tune/validate: allowlist your backup vendor maintenance tasks by account and parent process

Backup Infrastructure Signals

Enterprise backup servers are targets in their own right. Watch the host, the service state and who touches the repository:

// Sentinel (KQL) - backup services stopped or disabled
Event
| where EventLog == "System" and EventID == 7036
| where RenderedDescription has_any ("Veeam", "Backup Exec", "Acronis", "Commvault", "Cohesity", "Rubrik")
| where RenderedDescription has "stopped"
| summarize stops=count(), services=make_set(RenderedDescription, 10) by Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 30m)
| where stops >= 2
// tune/validate: service names vary by vendor and version
Vetted sources

SigmaHQ shadow copy and backup-deletion rules, Elastic and Splunk ESCU analytics for vssadmin and wbadmin, and CISA #StopRansomware guidance on offline, tested backups. Service names and maintenance windows are specific to your estate, so baseline them before alerting.

Build Detections That Fire

Mjolnir Security helps blue teams turn threat intelligence into high-fidelity detections across endpoint, network, identity and cloud telemetry.

Detection EngineeringManaged Detection & ResponseThreat HuntingIncident ResponsePurple Teaming
  • Detection Engineering We build and tune detections mapped to ATT&CK from your own telemetry.
  • Threat Hunting as a Service Hypothesis-driven hunts for the behaviours on this page.
  • 24/7 Incident Response Containment when a detection fires. Call +1 833 403 5875.
Written by: Mjolnir Threat Research (MTAC)  |  Published: October 12, 2026  |  Last reviewed: October 12, 2026