Ransomware crews know that a clean backup ends their leverage, so they go after it first: stopping backup services, deleting catalogs and shadow copies, and reaching into backup servers for stored credentials. These actions are rare in normal operations and tightly clustered before deployment, which makes them high-value early warnings.
Signals at a Glance
| Signal | Where | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|
| wbadmin delete catalog or delete systemstatebackup | Sysmon 1, 4688 | T1490 |
| vssadmin or wmic shadow copy deletion | Sysmon 1, EDR | T1490 |
| Backup agent or service stopped outside a change window | System 7036, EDR | T1489 |
| Non-backup process reading the backup configuration database | EDR, SQL audit | T1555 |
| Mass deletion of backup files on a repository share | File audit 4663 | T1485 |
Backup Destruction Commands
The built-in commands are noisy by design and almost never run by administrators at scale. Treat any occurrence outside a documented maintenance task as an alert, and raise it to critical when it follows credential access on the same host:
title: Backup Catalog or Shadow Copy Deletion
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
sel_wbadmin:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'wbadmin'
- 'delete'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'catalog'
- 'systemstatebackup'
- 'backup'
sel_vss:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'shadows'
- 'delete'
sel_wmic:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'shadowcopy'
- 'delete'
condition: 1 of sel_*
level: high
# tune/validate: allowlist your backup vendor maintenance tasks by account and parent process
Backup Infrastructure Signals
Enterprise backup servers are targets in their own right. Watch the host, the service state and who touches the repository:
// Sentinel (KQL) - backup services stopped or disabled
Event
| where EventLog == "System" and EventID == 7036
| where RenderedDescription has_any ("Veeam", "Backup Exec", "Acronis", "Commvault", "Cohesity", "Rubrik")
| where RenderedDescription has "stopped"
| summarize stops=count(), services=make_set(RenderedDescription, 10) by Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 30m)
| where stops >= 2
// tune/validate: service names vary by vendor and version
- Keep backup servers off the general domain admin tier, and alert on interactive logons to them from non-backup administrators.
- Enable immutability or air-gapped copies. Detection buys time; immutability removes the payoff.
- Alert on repository share deletions measured in files per minute, not just on single events.
- Page the incident team on backup tamper plus any credential-access signal within the same window.
SigmaHQ shadow copy and backup-deletion rules, Elastic and Splunk ESCU analytics for vssadmin and wbadmin, and CISA #StopRansomware guidance on offline, tested backups. Service names and maintenance windows are specific to your estate, so baseline them before alerting.
Build Detections That Fire
Mjolnir Security helps blue teams turn threat intelligence into high-fidelity detections across endpoint, network, identity and cloud telemetry.
- Detection Engineering We build and tune detections mapped to ATT&CK from your own telemetry.
- Threat Hunting as a Service Hypothesis-driven hunts for the behaviours on this page.
- 24/7 Incident Response Containment when a detection fires. Call +1 833 403 5875.
Stay ahead of emerging threats. Get notified when we publish new intelligence reports and advisories.
Subscribe to Alerts