Almost every hands-on-keyboard ransomware intrusion dumps credentials from LSASS to reach domain admin. That step happens hours to days before encryption, and it is loud when you look at the right telemetry: a handle with read-memory rights to lsass.exe, a living-off-the-land MiniDump call, or a fresh dump file on disk.
Signals at a Glance
| Signal | Where | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|
| Process access to lsass.exe with memory-read access masks | Sysmon 10, EDR | T1003.001 |
| rundll32 loading comsvcs.dll with MiniDump | Sysmon 1, 4688 | T1003.001 |
| ProcDump or similar with lsass as the target | Sysmon 1, EDR | T1003.001 |
| New .dmp file in a temp or public folder | Sysmon 11, EDR | T1003.001 |
| Credential Guard or RunAsPPL tampering | Registry, Sysmon 13 | T1562.001 |
Handle Access to LSASS
The most robust signal is the access itself, because it holds regardless of which tool the operator brings. Alert on non-system processes opening lsass.exe with the access masks that allow reading memory:
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010","0x1410","0x1438","0x143a","0x1fffff","0x1f3fff")
| search NOT SourceImage IN ("*MsMpEng.exe","*csrss.exe","*wininit.exe","*services.exe","*svchost.exe","*taskmgr.exe")
| stats count values(GrantedAccess) as masks by Computer SourceImage User
| sort - count
`comment("tune/validate: allowlist your EDR and backup agents by full path and signer")`
Living-off-the-Land Dumps
Operators avoid dropping Mimikatz by using binaries already on the host. The comsvcs.dll export called with an ordinal or MiniDump name, and signed Sysinternals tools, are common. A Sigma starting point:
title: LSASS Dump via comsvcs or ProcDump
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_comsvcs:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'comsvcs'
- 'MiniDump'
selection_ordinal:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'comsvcs'
- '#24'
selection_procdump:
Image|endswith:
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\procdump64.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'lsass'
condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
# tune/validate: confirm no sanctioned crash-dump tooling targets lsass
- Enable LSA protection (RunAsPPL) and Credential Guard where supported; then alert on any attempt to change them.
- Treat a confirmed dump as an incident, not an alert: reset the exposed accounts, starting with privileged and service accounts used on that host.
- Join the dump event to the logons that follow. Use of the dumped account on a second host within minutes is the fastest confirmation.
SigmaHQ credential-access rules, Elastic LSASS memory access detections and Splunk ESCU LSASS analytics cover this ground well, and MITRE CAR documents access-pattern analytics. Access masks and EDR allowlists differ per estate, so baseline your own environment before enforcing.
Build Detections That Fire
Mjolnir Security helps blue teams turn threat intelligence into high-fidelity detections across endpoint, network, identity and cloud telemetry.
- Detection Engineering We build and tune detections mapped to ATT&CK from your own telemetry.
- Threat Hunting as a Service Hypothesis-driven hunts for the behaviours on this page.
- 24/7 Incident Response Containment when a detection fires. Call +1 833 403 5875.
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