LSASS
MINIDUMP
SYSMON 10
CREDENTIALS
DetectionBlue TeamSOCOctober 12, 2026•9 min read

Detecting LSASS Credential Dumping as a Ransomware Precursor

Credential theft is the pivot between a foothold and a domain-wide outage. If you catch the LSASS dump, the operator does not yet have the keys to deploy at scale.

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Almost every hands-on-keyboard ransomware intrusion dumps credentials from LSASS to reach domain admin. That step happens hours to days before encryption, and it is loud when you look at the right telemetry: a handle with read-memory rights to lsass.exe, a living-off-the-land MiniDump call, or a fresh dump file on disk.

Signals at a Glance

SignalWhereATT&CK
Process access to lsass.exe with memory-read access masksSysmon 10, EDRT1003.001
rundll32 loading comsvcs.dll with MiniDumpSysmon 1, 4688T1003.001
ProcDump or similar with lsass as the targetSysmon 1, EDRT1003.001
New .dmp file in a temp or public folderSysmon 11, EDRT1003.001
Credential Guard or RunAsPPL tamperingRegistry, Sysmon 13T1562.001

Handle Access to LSASS

The most robust signal is the access itself, because it holds regardless of which tool the operator brings. Alert on non-system processes opening lsass.exe with the access masks that allow reading memory:

index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*lsass.exe"
    GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010","0x1410","0x1438","0x143a","0x1fffff","0x1f3fff")
| search NOT SourceImage IN ("*MsMpEng.exe","*csrss.exe","*wininit.exe","*services.exe","*svchost.exe","*taskmgr.exe")
| stats count values(GrantedAccess) as masks by Computer SourceImage User
| sort - count
`comment("tune/validate: allowlist your EDR and backup agents by full path and signer")`

Living-off-the-Land Dumps

Operators avoid dropping Mimikatz by using binaries already on the host. The comsvcs.dll export called with an ordinal or MiniDump name, and signed Sysinternals tools, are common. A Sigma starting point:

title: LSASS Dump via comsvcs or ProcDump
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_comsvcs:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'comsvcs'
      - 'MiniDump'
  selection_ordinal:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'comsvcs'
      - '#24'
  selection_procdump:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\procdump.exe'
      - '\procdump64.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'lsass'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
# tune/validate: confirm no sanctioned crash-dump tooling targets lsass
Vetted sources

SigmaHQ credential-access rules, Elastic LSASS memory access detections and Splunk ESCU LSASS analytics cover this ground well, and MITRE CAR documents access-pattern analytics. Access masks and EDR allowlists differ per estate, so baseline your own environment before enforcing.

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Written by: Mjolnir Threat Research (MTAC)  |  Published: October 12, 2026  |  Last reviewed: October 12, 2026