Operators stage data on a file server or a chosen workstation, compress it with an archiver, and often encrypt and split it so it transfers faster and escapes content inspection. Because staging happens on hosts you can instrument, it is frequently a better detection point than the egress itself.
Signals at a Glance
| Signal | Where | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|
| Archiver with password or header-encryption switches | Process creation | T1560.001 |
| Archiver invoked on a server with recursive wildcards over shares | Process creation | T1560.001 |
Multi-volume output (-v100m style) in a temp or public directory | Process creation, Sysmon 11 | T1074.001 |
Large archive created in C:\Users\Public, C:\PerfLogs or C:\Windows\Temp | Sysmon 11, EDR | T1074.001 |
| Archiver parent is a remote execution service or scripting engine | Process tree | T1560 |
Process Detection
The archivers are legitimate software, so the discriminators are the switches and the context. Passwords, header encryption, wildcards and volume splitting are uncommon in normal desktop use and routine in staging:
title: Archive Utility Used For Encrypted Or Split Staging
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
tool:
- Image|endswith:
- '\\7z.exe'
- '\\7za.exe'
- '\\rar.exe'
- '\\winrar.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- '7z.exe'
- '7za.exe'
- 'WinRAR.exe'
action:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' a '
protect:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -p'
- ' -hp'
- ' -mhe'
split:
CommandLine|re: ' -v[0-9]+[kmg]'
condition: tool and action and (protect or split)
level: medium
# tune/validate: allowlist backup and developer tooling by parent image and account
Hunt the file side as well. Many archives written in a short window, from a process that is not a backup agent, to a directory regular users rarely use, is the staging footprint even when the command line is hidden:
// Microsoft Defender XDR (KQL) - burst of large archive creation
// tune/validate: raise thresholds on build servers and backup targets
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)\.(7z|rar|zip|tar|gz|tgz|bz2|001)$"
| where FileSize > 100000000
| summarize archives = count(), totalGB = round(sum(FileSize) / 1073741824.0, 2),
dirs = dcount(FolderPath) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where archives >= 3 or totalGB > 5
| order by totalGB desc
Reading the Context
- Read activity before the archive: bulk file reads on a share from one account, visible in file-server auditing, precede almost every staging event.
- Look at what happens next. An archive followed within an hour by an upload tool, a new outbound connection or a copy to removable media completes the chain.
- On Linux, watch
tar,zipor7zunder/tmp,/dev/shmand/var/tmp, particularly withopenssl encorgpgin the same pipeline. - Deleted archives matter: a large file created and removed after a transfer is a cleanup indicator worth correlating.
SigmaHQ rules for archiver abuse and suspicious staging directories, Elastic detections for encrypted archive creation, and DFIR reports on ransomware staging behaviour. Baseline your own environment — developers, finance and backup jobs all create large archives legitimately.
Build Detections That Fire
Mjolnir Security helps blue teams turn threat intelligence into high-fidelity detections across endpoint, network, identity and cloud telemetry.
- Detection Engineering We build and tune detections mapped to ATT&CK from your own telemetry.
- Threat Hunting as a Service Hypothesis-driven hunts for the behaviours on this page.
- 24/7 Incident Response Containment when a detection fires. Call +1 833 403 5875.
Stay ahead of emerging threats. Get notified when we publish new intelligence reports and advisories.
Subscribe to Alerts