ClickFix lures show a fake verification or error page and instruct the visitor to press Win+R, paste and press Enter. The page placed a one-line command on the clipboard, so the user runs it by hand. There is no attachment to scan, but the endpoint leaves clear traces: the Run dialog history, an interpreter launched from explorer and a command that downloads and executes.
Signals at a Glance
| Signal | Where | ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|
| RunMRU value containing powershell, mshta, curl or a download cradle | Sysmon 13, registry telemetry | T1204 |
| explorer.exe spawning powershell, mshta or cmd with hidden window and iex or irm | Sysmon 1, EDR | T1059.001 |
| Command line carrying a fake verification comment (for example reCAPTCHA or Verification ID text) | Sysmon 1, EDR | T1059.001 |
| Interpreter fetching a remote script moments after a browser visit to a rare site | Proxy, EDR network | T1105 |
| Run dialog usage by users who never use it | Behaviour baseline | T1204 |
The Run Dialog Leaves a Trail
Commands entered in the Run dialog are recorded under the user's RunMRU key. Real users enter short program names; a long command with a download cradle or script host is distinctive:
title: Suspicious Command Stored in Run Dialog History
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: '\Explorer\RunMRU'
content:
Details|contains:
- 'powershell'
- 'mshta'
- 'iex'
- 'irm '
- 'curl '
- 'bitsadmin'
- 'verification'
- 'not a robot'
condition: selection and content
level: high
# tune/validate: admins legitimately run short commands from Run; raise the bar with length or the presence of a URL.
Process and Command Line
The same event shows up as a process tree: explorer launches an interpreter with a hidden window and a command that retrieves and runs remote content. Pad-comment text, added to look like a verification step, is a strong signature of the current lure family:
// Defender XDR (KQL) - explorer.exe launching interpreters with download-and-run content
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe","cmd.exe","wscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex","invoke-expression","irm ","invoke-restmethod","downloadstring",
"mshta http","curl ","-w hidden","-windowstyle hidden","-enc")
or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(not a robot|recaptcha|verification id|human verification)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
// tune/validate: IT launch scripts from Start menu shortcuts also have explorer as parent
- Disable the Run dialog for general users where the business allows, using the Explorer NoRun policy, and review PowerShell constrained language mode for non-admin accounts.
- Brief users with a single rule: no website legitimately asks you to paste a command into Windows. Give them a one-click report route.
- Hunt browsers for pages that write to the clipboard on a click, using web-filtering categories for newly seen and low-reputation sites.
- Search for the same lure family on macOS and Linux, where the command is pasted into a terminal rather than the Run dialog.
Use SigmaHQ Run-key and RunMRU rules, Elastic's PowerShell-from-explorer detections, Microsoft threat intelligence write-ups on ClickFix and your web-filtering vendor's categories. Baseline your own environment — help-desk staff and admins use the Run dialog legitimately.
Build Detections That Fire
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- Detection Engineering We build and tune detections mapped to ATT&CK from your own telemetry.
- Threat Hunting as a Service Hypothesis-driven hunts for the behaviours on this page.
- 24/7 Incident Response Containment when a detection fires. Call +1 833 403 5875.
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