CLICKFIX
FAKE CAPTCHA
RUNMRU
WIN+R
DetectionBlue TeamSOCOctober 12, 2026•9 min read

Detecting ClickFix and Fake-CAPTCHA Paste-and-Run Lures

The user types the attack. No file arrives, no exploit fires, and the browser has already put the command on the clipboard.

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ClickFix lures show a fake verification or error page and instruct the visitor to press Win+R, paste and press Enter. The page placed a one-line command on the clipboard, so the user runs it by hand. There is no attachment to scan, but the endpoint leaves clear traces: the Run dialog history, an interpreter launched from explorer and a command that downloads and executes.

Signals at a Glance

SignalWhereATT&CK
RunMRU value containing powershell, mshta, curl or a download cradleSysmon 13, registry telemetryT1204
explorer.exe spawning powershell, mshta or cmd with hidden window and iex or irmSysmon 1, EDRT1059.001
Command line carrying a fake verification comment (for example reCAPTCHA or Verification ID text)Sysmon 1, EDRT1059.001
Interpreter fetching a remote script moments after a browser visit to a rare siteProxy, EDR networkT1105
Run dialog usage by users who never use itBehaviour baselineT1204

The Run Dialog Leaves a Trail

Commands entered in the Run dialog are recorded under the user's RunMRU key. Real users enter short program names; a long command with a download cradle or script host is distinctive:

title: Suspicious Command Stored in Run Dialog History
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: registry_set
detection:
  selection:
    TargetObject|contains: '\Explorer\RunMRU'
  content:
    Details|contains:
      - 'powershell'
      - 'mshta'
      - 'iex'
      - 'irm '
      - 'curl '
      - 'bitsadmin'
      - 'verification'
      - 'not a robot'
  condition: selection and content
level: high
# tune/validate: admins legitimately run short commands from Run; raise the bar with length or the presence of a URL.

Process and Command Line

The same event shows up as a process tree: explorer launches an interpreter with a hidden window and a command that retrieves and runs remote content. Pad-comment text, added to look like a verification step, is a strong signature of the current lure family:

// Defender XDR (KQL) - explorer.exe launching interpreters with download-and-run content
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe","cmd.exe","wscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex","invoke-expression","irm ","invoke-restmethod","downloadstring",
                                    "mshta http","curl ","-w hidden","-windowstyle hidden","-enc")
      or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(not a robot|recaptcha|verification id|human verification)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
// tune/validate: IT launch scripts from Start menu shortcuts also have explorer as parent
Vetted sources

Use SigmaHQ Run-key and RunMRU rules, Elastic's PowerShell-from-explorer detections, Microsoft threat intelligence write-ups on ClickFix and your web-filtering vendor's categories. Baseline your own environment — help-desk staff and admins use the Run dialog legitimately.

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Written by: Mjolnir Threat Research (MTAC)  |  Published: October 12, 2026  |  Last reviewed: October 12, 2026