ONENOTE
.ONE
EMBEDDED FILE
TEMP EXPORT
DetectionBlue TeamSOCOctober 12, 2026•9 min read

Detecting Malicious OneNote Attachments

OneNote lets a page hold a file and a fake button. The warning dialog is the only thing between the click and the script.

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During the 2023 wave of OneNote abuse, attackers embedded scripts, executables and shortcuts in .one notebooks and placed a decoy graphic over them, so a double-click on a button ran the hidden file. Microsoft has since extended blocked-extension handling for embedded files, but notebooks remain a delivery format worth covering.

Signals at a Glance

SignalWhereATT&CK
onenote.exe spawning wscript, cscript, cmd, powershell or mshtaSysmon 1, EDRT1204.002
Embedded file extracted under the OneNote export folder in the user Temp directorySysmon 11T1204.002
Execution from a path containing OneNote and ExportedSysmon 1T1059.005
Inbound .one attachment from an external first-contact senderEmail gatewayT1566.001
Notebook with image-covered embedded objects and a small amount of textFile inspectionT1027

Execution From the Export Path

When a user opens an embedded file, OneNote writes it to a temporary export directory and launches it. That sequence gives two independent detections: the interpreter whose parent is OneNote, and any execution from the export path:

title: OneNote Spawns Script Host or Interpreter
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\onenote.exe'
  child:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
  from_export:
    Image|contains|all:
      - '\OneNote\'
      - '\Exported\'
  condition: parent and child or from_export
level: high
# tune/validate: confirm the export path pattern on your Office build; legitimate OneNote add-ins rarely launch interpreters.

Reducing the Surface

Hunt delivery in message trace and constrain what the application will open. Most organisations have little business need for externally sourced notebooks:

index=email sourcetype=o365:messagetrace
| eval ext=lower(mvindex(split(AttachmentName, "."), -1))
| where ext="one" OR ext="onetoc2"
| stats count dc(RecipientAddress) as recipients values(SenderAddress) as senders by AttachmentName, SHA256
| where recipients >= 1
| sort - recipients
# tune/validate: field names depend on your O365 add-on and gateway; enrich with first-contact status of the sender.
Vetted sources

Use SigmaHQ OneNote and Office child-process rules, Elastic's OneNote detections, Microsoft guidance on blocked file extensions in OneNote, and your email gateway's attachment-type policies. Baseline your own environment before enabling attachment blocking.

Build Detections That Fire

Mjolnir Security helps blue teams turn threat intelligence into high-fidelity detections across endpoint, network, identity and cloud telemetry.

Detection EngineeringManaged Detection & ResponseThreat HuntingIncident ResponsePurple Teaming
  • Detection Engineering We build and tune detections mapped to ATT&CK from your own telemetry.
  • Threat Hunting as a Service Hypothesis-driven hunts for the behaviours on this page.
  • 24/7 Incident Response Containment when a detection fires. Call +1 833 403 5875.
Written by: Mjolnir Threat Research (MTAC)  |  Published: October 12, 2026  |  Last reviewed: October 12, 2026